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In re Williams Securities Litigation—WCG Subclass:
How Dura Met Daubert
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
recently decided a large securities fraud case that will have a
significant impact on evidentiary standards pertaining to loss
causation theories. The court’s February 18, 2009, opinion was its
first to apply the Supreme Court’s loss causation standard set forth in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.1 The case, In re Williams
Securities Litigation—WCG Subclass,2 addressed the question of
whether the district court abused its discretion in granting summary
judgment to the defendants on the issue of loss causation after
excluding the plaintiffs’ expert witness testimony. The court
excluded the expert’s testimony on the ground that his loss causation
scenarios were based on an unreliable methodology.3
In deciding Williams, the Tenth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to consider Dura’s requirements in response to a
Daubert challenge. After juxtaposing Dura’s standards with those set
forth by Daubert and its progeny, the appellate court affirmed both
the lower court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and its
grant of summary judgment for the defendants. Though the
standards announced by the Tenth Circuit are more burdensome on
plaintiffs than those imposed by other courts, Williams is more in
line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning and policy underlying Dura
than cases decided in other jurisdictions.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual Background
Following the forced breakup of AT&T in the early 1980s,4
WMB (an energy company that produces and transports natural gas)
1. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
2. 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
3. Id. at 1132, 1143.
4. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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planned to run fiber-optic cables through decommissioned
pipelines.5 As part of this plan, WMB formed a telecommunications
subsidiary
called
Williams
Telecommunications
Company
(“WilTel”), which eventually constructed a nationwide digital fiberoptic network of approximately 9,700 route miles.6
In 1995, WMB sold WilTel for $2.5 billion to LDDS
Communications.7 Excluded from the sale, among other things, was
a single fiber-optic strand along the original nationwide network.8 As
a condition of the sale, WMB agreed to a three year non-compete
agreement that prevented it from reentering the telecommunications
industry until 1998.9
When WMB’s non-compete agreement expired in January 1998,
the Telecom Index was thriving—up 42% since the beginning of the
previous year.10 Seeking to reenter the telecommunications industry,
WMB formed the subsidiary WCG with the objective of building a
nationwide fiber-optic network for the exclusive purpose of
providing services to communications service providers.11 By the end
of the year, the Telecom Index climbed to 500.91, up 63%.12
In light of the favorable market conditions and in an effort to
raise additional capital for operations and continued network
construction, WCG conducted an IPO on October 1, 1999.13 That
day, WCG’s stock ended trading at $28.06 per share, and the
Telecom Index reached 616.80 (a gain for the Index of 23% since
the end of 1998).14 The months following WCG’s IPO showed
exceptional growth for both WCG’s stock price and the Telecom
Index, with WCG peaking on March 7, 2000, at $61.81 and the
Telecom Index reaching its peak three days later at 1248.06.15

5. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D.
Okla. 2007), aff’d, 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1205.
13. See id. at 1206.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1207.
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Over the next several months, WCG and the Telecom Index
both declined significantly.16 By July 21, 2000, WCG’s trading price
was down to $29.38 (a decrease of more than 50% compared to its
peak).17 Similarly, the Telecom Index had fallen an alarming 28%
since its zenith.18 On July 24, 2000, the beginning of the class
period, WMB announced its plan to spin off WCG in a tax free
distribution to its shareholders.19 A November 16, 2000, press
release quoted WMB’s CEO, defendant Keith Bailey, as saying:
This important step continues a process that we believe remains in
the best long-term interests of our shareholders. [WMB and WCG]
have tremendous opportunities before them. Creating the most
effective and efficient access to capital will help fuel that growth,
and we believe that can best be achieved by creating two
independent businesses.20

Conversations among WMB’s board members revealed,
however, that the real reason behind the spin-off was the board’s
concern over how WCG was affecting WMB’s balance sheet: the
massive capital expenditures necessary to keep WCG going were
jeopardizing WMB’s credit rating and its ability to obtain financing
to pursue its own business goals.21 Many board members saw the
spin-off as an opportunity to “heave the junk called WCG overboard
as fast as possible.”22
Publicly, WMB extolled the strength and promise WCG enjoyed.
Shareholders were told that WCG was “strongly positioned for
success”23 and “pre-funded for their capital needs . . . to carry them
to that point of EBITDA positive.”24 During a road show, executives
continued to tout how the spin-off would fully allow each company
to pursue its respective business strategies and increase access to
capital, creating a “Win-Win for WMB and WCG shareholders.”25

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 1211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1216–17.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1218, 1222.
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WMB’s public statements painted a bright and promising future for
WCG as an independent company.
Within the company, however, the opinions regarding WCG’s
ability to satisfy its capital needs were much more pessimistic. In
September 2000, after WCG’s August sale of $1 billion in high yield
bonds, WMB’s board of directors was told that, although the bond
offering raised more capital than initially forecasted, WCG was still
underfunded through the end of 2001 by approximately $800
million.26 Bailey expressed his concerns when he declared that the
company had no other choice but to go on a “capital diet” and sell
off non-core assets.27
After the spin-off on April 23, 2001, WCG continued to paint a
rosy picture of the company’s present condition and future
prospects.28 A couple months after the split, WCG’s CEO, defendant
Howard Janzen, stated that WCG had funding in place to take the
company to 2004, with a plan to be cash flow positive by the end of
2003.29 Janzen also commented that the company was positioned to
not only survive the market slowdown, but to thrive in the coming
years.30
Inside the company, the board members were receiving a
different story. At an August presentation, WCG board members
were told that the company was “very close to falling into a chasm of
the red ‘danger’ zone” and that WCG’s cash flow was insufficient to
service its debt.31 By the end of 2001, WCG’s stock price had fallen
to $2.35 per share and the Telecom Index was down to 236.63.32
The first quarter of 2002 consisted of devastating blow after
devastating blow to WCG’s shareholders and WCG’s stock price.
The most substantial releases of negative company information
occurred on four separate occasions. On January 29, WMB
announced that its 2001 earnings report would be delayed while the

26. Id. at 1212.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 1222 (“WCG is strongly positioned for success. Its core network asset is in
place. It has demonstrated history of technical performance. And, it has the financial resources
in place to enable it to deliver on the promise of a very bright future.”).
29. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1133–34 (10th Cir.
2009).
30. Id. at 1134.
31. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
32. Id. at 1224.
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company assessed its contingent obligation with respect to WCG.33
That same day, Milberg Weiss filed the Cali complaint—the first of
the lawsuits against WCG (and later consolidated).34 WCG’s stock
price fell that day from $1.63 to $1.34.35
Just a few days later, a second major revelation occurred. On
February 4, WCG announced that it was reviewing the potential
impairment of its long-lived assets and that its lenders had recently
informed WCG that the company may be in default under its credit
agreement.36 As a result of the default notice, WCG agreed to submit
a strategy for restructuring and deleveraging its balance sheet to the
banks.37 WCG reassuringly added that “successful execution of the
options currently envisioned does not include seeking bankruptcy
protection or the substantial dilution of equity security holders.”38
That day, the company’s stock fell again, from $1.42 to $1.00.39
The third substantial disclosure occurred on February 25, when
WCG revealed that it was considering the potential benefits of
Chapter Eleven reorganization.40 After this announcement, WCG’s
stock fell by 61.6% to close at $0.22 per share.41 Finally, on April 22,
after the closing bell rang, WCG filed for bankruptcy.42 The next
trading day WCG’s stock price closed at $0.06—a 67.3% drop from
the day before.43 During this same period, the Telecom Index had
shrunk to 148.94, 12% percent of its March 10, 2000, high.44
B. The Daubert Challenge and Summary Judgment at the
District Court
The disposition of Williams hinges on the district court’s rulings
over a Daubert challenge and a summary judgment motion. These
motions resulted in a combined filing of 212 motions, briefs,

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id. (reporting net of market and industry effects).
Id. at 1225–26.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
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exhibits, and appendices totaling more than 36,650 pages.45 The
defendants’ Daubert challenge was based, in part,46 on a perceived
failure of one of the plaintiffs’ proposed expert witnesses to reliably
prove loss causation as required under the standard recently clarified
by the Supreme Court in Dura.47 The defendants’ success on the
Daubert motion was a prerequisite to their success on the motion for
summary judgment as to loss causation.
In an effort to prove loss causation, Dr. Nye (the plaintiffs’
expert) presented two48 loss causation scenarios. The first scenario
was based on a “leakage” theory.49 Under this theory, nearly the
entire decline in WCG’s stock price was ascribed to the gradual
“leaking” of WCG’s alleged fraud into the market.50 This theory
presumed that the market had not been alerted to the fraud prior to
January 29, 2002.51 The leakage theory attributed shareholder losses
to the “materialization of the concealed risks, specifically that WCG’s
assets were overstated, that WCG was in default of its debt
covenants, and that there was significant uncertainty about WCG’s
ability to continue as a going concern.”52 According to the theory,
WCG’s true value was its trading price on the day the company
declared bankruptcy.53 However, because the leakage theory failed to
account for other “obvious alternative explanations,”54 the district
court found that it was an unreliable method for proving loss
causation.55
Dr. Nye’s second loss causation scenario rested on a “corrective
disclosure” theory. This theory focused on price declines following
45. Id. at 1204.
46. Id. at 1253 n.36.
47. Id. at 1252–53.
48. Dr. Nye actually prepared three loss causation scenarios, but Scenario 2 and
Alternative Scenario 2 contained no differences “with respect to the matters which the court
[found] to be dispositive.” Id. at 1261.
49. Id. at 1253–58.
50. Id. at 1253–54.
51. Id. at 1256–57.
52. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (10th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
54. Id. at 1266–67. “He fails to differentiate between losses rooted in causes cognizable
under loss causation doctrine, on one hand, and, on the other hand, losses attributable to
industry-specific stresses, the meltdown in the telecommunications sector, and other negative
developments unrelated to the alleged fraud.” Id. at 1266.
55. Id. at 1267.
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four specific public announcements: WMB’s January 29, 2002, press
release announcing the delay of its earnings report; the February 4,
2002, revelation by WCG that it may be in default; WCG’s February
25, 2002, announcement concerning the possibility of the company
filing bankruptcy; and WCG filing for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy
protection on April 23, 2002.56 Under the corrective disclosure
theory, the drop in value after each corrective disclosure was credited
to the revelation of fraud.57 Dr. Nye asserted that, although these
“partial disclosures” did not precisely mirror the alleged
misrepresentations, they nonetheless “revealed the risks that had
been concealed by the prior misrepresentations and omissions.”58
Thus, the four corrective disclosures represented the materialization
of the concealed risks and, therefore, caused the shareholders’ losses.
The district court excluded Dr. Nye’s testimony regarding the
corrective disclosure theory on the grounds that it was unreliable
under Daubert.59 Specifically, the court found that this theory failed
to establish that “any material, new, company-specific, and fraudrelated information became available to the efficient market on
January 29, 2002, or on the three subsequent corrective disclosure
dates proposed by plaintiffs.”60 Accordingly, the court found that
there was no “triable issue as to loss causation,” and therefore
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.61 The
plaintiffs appealed both the Daubert ruling and the court’s grant of
summary judgment.
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Dura
The importance of Williams is found where Daubert and its
progeny intersect with Dura. Dura establishes the level of causation
plaintiffs must prove in order to bring a securities fraud claim;
Daubert helps govern the reliability of proffered expert testimony.
Thus, for a plaintiff’s expert to testify on the issue of loss causation
(and meet the requirements of Dura), he must first pass Daubert
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1225–27, 1258.
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1269 n.53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1294–95.
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scrutiny. Understanding the interplay of these two doctrines is
necessary to fully appreciate the impact of Williams.
The basic elements of a federal securities fraud action include (1)
a material misstatement or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection
between the misstatement or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.62 The
last of these elements, loss causation, was addressed by the Supreme
Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.63
In Dura, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, a
pharmaceutical company and various individuals, made false
statements about the profitability of certain drugs and the future
FDA approval of a new product.64 Plaintiffs further alleged that these
misrepresentations caused them to purchase the defendant’s stock at
an artificially inflated price.65 The Court concluded that, contrary to
the “price inflation” theory, plaintiffs could not meet their burden of
proving that a defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss merely by
demonstrating that the plaintiffs purchased stock at an artificially
inflated price.66 The court noted that loss causation—the “causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss”—is
established by showing that the disclosure of “the relevant truth”
resulted in a loss attributable to “the earlier misrepresentation.”67 In
effect, Dura did away with the price inflation theory by unanimously
labeling it insufficient.68 However, while Dura explained what form
of pleading was inadequate, it did not go so far as to say what level
of detail would be sufficient to show loss causation.
Decisions interpreting Dura prove helpful in determining what a
plaintiff must allege in order to meet Dura’s loss causation pleading
standard. Based on lower court decisions, plaintiffs can meet Dura’s
standards in two ways. The first is by adequately demonstrating that
the plaintiffs’ losses were caused by the corrective disclosure of a
previously concealed truth.69 Under this approach, plaintiffs must

62. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 339.
65. Id. at 340.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 342–43.
68. Id. at 348.
69. See, e.g., Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Rouhana (In re Winstar Commc’ns.), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7618 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006); In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 266
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show that the price of a corporation’s stock dropped in response to a
public disclosure that revealed a prior fraudulent misrepresentation
or omission regarding the value of that security.70 Additionally, a
plaintiff proceeding under a corrective disclosure theory must
differentiate between disclosures relating to fraud and any other
negative company- or industry-specific information simultaneously
revealed (often referred to as “multiple causation.”) Where there is
an industry-wide catastrophe accompanied by an immense flow of
negative information (unrelated to fraud) about the industry and
company in question, the non-fraud “contributing forces must be
isolated and removed.”71 Thus, by isolating the non-fraud forces
from the corrective disclosure, a plaintiff can establish the causal
connection between the revelation of fraud and his losses.
Under the second, alternative method of proving loss causation,
the plaintiffs may allege materialization of the concealed risk. Using
this model, plaintiffs must show that the defendants’ misstatements
or omissions concealed risks that later materialized (in a way other
than by a public corrective disclosure) to cause the plaintiffs’ losses.72
Although Dura did not expressly describe the concept of
materialization of the risk as a substitute for corrective disclosure, the
Supreme Court did recognize the possibility that there could be
cases in which the “relevant truth begins to leak out.”73 This
approach, however, does not do away with Dura’s requirement that
the plaintiffs must establish a causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the loss: if a plaintiff asserts that the fraud
surfaced through disclosure of another event (which caused the
concealed risk to materialize), then the plaintiff “must provide proof
that the market recognized a relationship between the event
disclosed and the fraud.”74 Under both approaches, this causal
connection is usually shown with the help of expert witnesses.75 An
expert witness, though, must be able to pass Daubert scrutiny.
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18448
(D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005).
70. Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 1447 n.5.
72. In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
73. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
74. McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32164, at *26–27
(D.N.J. June 30, 2005).
75. Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447 n.5.
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B. Daubert
Since the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended in 2000,
district judges have been entrusted with the duty to serve as
evidentiary “gatekeepers.”76 This gatekeeping function is meant to
prevent juries from hearing irrelevant and unreliable expert
testimony.77 In essence, the trial judge is required to “assess the
reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, and
determine whether it is scientifically valid and applicable to a
particular set of facts.”78 This is accomplished by subjecting the
proffered expert testimony to a Daubert analysis.
As an integral part of any Daubert analysis, a trial judge must
determine the relevance of the proposed expert testimony.79 As
explained in the Federal Rules of Evidence, “‘[r]elevant evidence’
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”80
Thus, even when proffered expert testimony is reliable, it is to be
excluded if it does not have “sufficient bearing on the issue at
hand.”81
In addition to making relevance determinations, Daubert
scrutiny also addresses the reliability of proffered expert testimony.82
To assess reliability, the court must determine whether an expert’s
conclusions are the result of “(i) application of that expertise using
recognized and supportable methodologies, (ii) on the basis of
adequate data which is (iii) rationally tied to the opinions which
purport to be based on that data.”83 By way of assistance, the
Supreme Court in Daubert enumerated several nonexclusive factors
that the district court may consider in making a determination as to

76. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
77. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90.
78. Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir.
2000).
79. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
80. FED. R. EVID. 401.
81. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2004).
82. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Ralston v. Smith & Nephew
Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2001).
83. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1235 (2007); see
also FED. R. EVID. 702.
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reliability: (1) whether the theory is susceptible to an objective
challenge, (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication,” (3) the “known or potential rate of
error” associated with the methodology employed, and (4) whether
the theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.84
This list is not exhaustive, and the district court has broad discretion
to consider a variety of other factors.85
When subjecting proffered expert testimony to a Daubert
analysis, “‘any step that renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders
the expert’s testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step
completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that
methodology.’”86 A successful Daubert challenge, if made to exclude
expert testimony regarding a necessary element of the proponent’s
case, may result in an entry of summary judgment as a matter of
law.87
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
On appeal from the Northern District of Oklahoma, the Tenth
Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in
granting summary judgment to the Williams defendants after
excluding the plaintiffs’ expert witness’s testimony concerning loss
causation on the grounds that it was unreliable under Daubert.88
After considering two scenarios offered by the plaintiffs’ expert
witness, the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs “failed to identify
a causal nexus between the revelation of the previously-concealed
truth and the decline in value of WCG securities.”89 Without a
showing “that their losses were caused by a revelation of the fraud
and not some [other] non-compensable” factor, the plaintiffs did not
adequately answer the issue of loss causation as required by Dura.90
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed both the district court’s

84. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
85. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
86. Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)).
87. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1997).
88. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 2009).
89. Id. at 1143.
90. Id.

225

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/6/2010 2:19 PM

2010

exclusion of the expert testimony and the grant of summary
judgment.91
A. Loss Causation: Scenario One—Leakage and Materialization of the
Concealed Risks
In reviewing the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Nye’s
testimony, the circuit court first considered whether the trial court
properly excluded Scenario One as a basis for loss causation. Under
Scenario One, the plaintiffs’ expert first attempted to prove loss
causation on a leakage theory.92 The plaintiffs’ expert put forth the
idea that the relevant truth regarding WCG’s alleged fraud gradually
leaked into the market—as opposed to a “full and immediate
disclosure”—which caused the corporation’s stock price to fall.93 As
it would do with a corrective disclosure theory, the court considered
whether the plaintiffs had linked the revelation of the alleged fraud
to actual losses: it is not enough to say, “Well, the market must have
known.”94 This is essentially what the plaintiffs’ expert argued under
his first theory.
Under the leakage theory, Dr. Nye asserted that, within the class
period, “a number of tiny corrective disclosures occurred each and
every day . . . which had the cumulative [result] of gradually
revealing the fraud.”95 In support of this theory, Dr. Nye “submitted
a 1300-page compendium of news articles, reports, and SEC filings
that was supposed to show ‘numerous instances of leakage of
corrective information concerning WCG’s true financial
condition.’”96 The Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, that the
majority of these
clippings either pertained to
the
telecommunications industry as a whole or contained positive
statements about WCG.97 Because none of the announcements
revealed anything negative about WCG particularly, the circuit court
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
the leakage theory.98
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

226

Id.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In response to the court’s dismissal of the leakage theory, the
plaintiffs contended that Scenario One was developed, instead, to
support loss causation based on the theory of materialization of the
concealed risks.99 Plaintiffs argued that the primary purpose of
Scenario One was not that any specific disclosure notified the market
of fraud, but, rather, that the “[p]laintiffs’ losses were caused by the
materialization of the concealed risks . . . .”100 While the court
acknowledged that materialization of the concealed risks is a viable
theory, it had a problem with this justification because Dr. Nye failed
to identify any specific occasion within the class period when these
concealed risks actually materialized.101 The court reminded the
plaintiffs that such a theory “would still have to identify when the
materialization occurred and link it to a corresponding loss.”102
Ultimately, the appellate court found Scenario One an unreliable
method for proving loss causation because it failed to specifically
identify the losses attributable to fraud. Instead, the first loss scenario
assumed that any decline in WCG stock was attributable to the
revelation of fraud.103 The Tenth Circuit noted that this approach
failed to “differentiate between losses rooted in causes cognizable
under loss causation doctrine, on one hand, and, on the other hand,
losses attributable to industry-specific stresses, the meltdown in the
telecommunications sector, and other negative developments
unrelated to the alleged fraud.”104 Thus, Scenario One could not be
used by the plaintiffs to prove loss causation due to its unreliability
under Daubert.
B. Loss Causation: Scenario Two—Corrective Disclosures
Even though Scenario One was the plaintiffs’ preferred loss
causation theory, they also provided an alternate theory.105 Scenario
Two identified four specific corrective disclosures that occurred
during the class period: WMB’s January 29, 2002, press release
announcing the delay of its earnings report; the February 4, 2002,
revelation by WCG that it may be in default; WCG’s February 25,
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1135.
Id.
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2002, announcement concerning the possibility of the company
filing bankruptcy; and WCG actually filing for Chapter Eleven
bankruptcy protection on April 25, 2002.106 The court added that
the disclosure, to be corrective, did not have to “precisely mirror the
earlier misrepresentation, but it must at least relate back to the
misrepresentation and not to some other negative information about
the company.”107 Thus, the question became whether “the risk that
caused the loss was within the zone of risk concealed by the
misrepresentations and omissions alleged by a disappointed
investor.”108
In analyzing the reliability of Scenario Two, the appellate court
examined each of the four disclosures. The court needed to
determine if the information they revealed was sufficiently within the
zone of risk. This was necessary to support Dr. Nye’s conclusion that
it was the revelation of fraud, and not other non-compensatory
factors, that caused the subsequent declines in WCG’s stock price.109
1. January 29, 2002, corrective disclosure
Dr. Nye identified the January 29 press release as the first
corrective disclosure.110 On this occasion, WMB announced a delay
in the release of its fourth quarter financial statements while the
company reviewed the status of certain contingent liabilities it had
with respect to WCG.111 Following this announcement, the share
price fell from $1.63 to $1.34.112 Dr. Nye admitted that this was not
a significant negative return for that day given the fact that the
market as a whole fell 2.5% and the industry was down as well.113
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that an announcement that WCG
could be in default may fall within the zone of risk concealed by the
alleged misrepresentations, but questioned whether Dr. Nye’s basis
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1140.
108. Id. (quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005)
(original emphasis omitted)).
109. Id. at 1140–43.
110. In the heading on page 1140, the court labeled this disclosure as “January 29,
2009.” Id. at 1140. The remainder of the opinion, however, makes it clear that the actual date
of disclosure must have been January 29, 2002, as it clearly preceded the February 4, 2002,
disclosure. Id. at 1140–43.
111. Id. at 1140–42.
112. Id. at 1140–41.
113. Id. at 1141.
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for asserting that the January 29 press release revealed any new
information to the market that would make that day’s losses
attributable to the disclosure.114 The court also quickly pointed out
that, on that same day, Milberg Weiss filed its Cali complaint
identifying the same misrepresentations. This suggests that the
market already had at least some knowledge of the fraud.115 With at
least one other major piece of negative information having been
released on the same day, the court lacked a detailed analysis by Dr.
Nye showing why all the losses from that day should be attributed to
the press release (and its assumed revelation of fraud) and nothing
else.116
2. February 4, 2002, corrective disclosure
The second corrective disclosure identified by Dr. Nye occurred
on February 4. That day’s press release made two announcements:
(1) WCG had been informed by its lenders that it may be in default,
and (2) WCG was reviewing the potential impairment of its longlived assets.117 As with the January 29 announcement, Dr. Nye
credited the entire decline in WCG’s stock price that day to the press
release without first considering the effect other non-fraudulent
factors might have had.118 In fact, the court notes, the press release
itself revealed a significant piece of information unrelated to fraud:
WCG was performing a review of the possible impairment of its
long-lived assets.119 Dr. Nye did not provide an explanation as to
why the entire February 4 decline should be ascribed to fraud and
not to other information also revealed that day.120
3. February 25 and April 22, 2002, corrective disclosures
The last two corrective disclosures were WCG’s announcement
on February 25 that it was considering Chapter Eleven bankruptcy
and the company’s actual filing of bankruptcy on April 22.121 The

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiffs argued that bankruptcy was within the zone of risk
concealed by the earlier alleged misrepresentations and, therefore,
the losses following these announcements could fairly be attributed
to the revelation of fraud.122 The appellate court disagreed: “The
alleged misstatements involved the risks of defaulting on debt and
the true reasons that WCG was spun off from WMB; they did not
involve the certainty of a bankruptcy.”123 The court noted that
bankruptcy might have been a possibility—even a probability—from
the moment WCG was spun off.124 Expressing doubt as to Dr. Nye’s
conclusions, the court asserted, “[T]here are simply too many
potential intervening causes to say that bankruptcy was WCG’s
legally foreseeable destiny such that its trading price at bankruptcy
equaled its true value on the day the spinoff was announced.”125
As with Scenario One, the appellate court found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Scenario Two was based
on an unreliable methodology for proving loss causation.126 In so
doing, the court noted that Dr. Nye himself failed to link the four
disclosures to any of the alleged misrepresentations;127 he neglected
to discuss why these particular disclosures should be considered
“corrective;”128 and he did not account for any potential non-fraud
related information that could have also affected WCG’s value.129 In
light of these findings, the Tenth Circuit determined that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected the second loss
causation scenario as unreliable under Daubert.130
C. Summary Judgment
The plaintiffs argued that, even if the district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding Dr. Nye’s testimony, it improperly granted
summary judgment.131 They contended that there was still a genuine

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1143.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1140 (“[Dr. Nye] admitted, ‘I have not tied those four things specifically to
allege[d] misrepresentations.’”).
128. Id. at 1139–40.
129. Id. at 1143.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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issue of material fact as to loss causation and that a jury should
decide the question.132 Unconvinced, the appellate court commented
that, given the evidence presented, there was “simply no way for a
juror to determine whether the alleged fraud caused any portion of
Plaintiffs’ loss.”133 Since the plaintiffs were unable to meet their
burden under Dura, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment as to the issue of loss causation.134
V. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Williams has several significant
implications for securities fraud plaintiffs. First, Williams clarifies the
contours of Dura’s loss causation requirements and provides a
warning to securities fraud plaintiffs that courts may exclude expert
testimony that neither passes Daubert scrutiny nor meets Dura’s
pleading requirements. Second, Williams established that plaintiffs
carry a relatively hefty evidentiary burden in order to proceed on a
securities fraud claim, which is in harmony with the language of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Act”), as well as the
reasoning and policy driving the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura.
A. Williams’s Warning
Although Dura rejected the price inflation theory as an adequate
basis for proving loss causation, it did not set the precise level of
proof required by plaintiffs in order to satisfy their loss causation
burden. Williams clarified this uncertainty within the Tenth Circuit
by holding that plaintiffs, regardless of the loss causation theory they
use, must (1) disentangle any potential non-fraud factors from those
revealing the alleged misrepresentations or omissions and (2) link the
disclosure of the truth regarding the alleged misrepresentations or
omissions to a subsequent loss.135
Because Williams’s application of Dura’s standards requires
plaintiffs to present affirmative evidence as to loss causation, event
studies will most assuredly become common place in securities fraud
litigation. Without such studies, it will be impossible for plaintiffs to
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1140–43.
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adequately link for the jury—or trial judges performing their
gatekeeping function—the public disclosure of the alleged fraud to a
subsequent loss, and to isolate from the tangle of possible factors the
portion of the loss actually attributable to the revelation of the
alleged fraud.
Given the defendants’ success in Williams, the loss causation
experts retained and the event studies prepared in anticipation of
litigation will increasingly become the subject of Daubert challenges.
Defendants making such a challenge can allege that experts are
unqualified as to the area of loss causation or that their testimony is
unreliable and inadmissible under Daubert. Plaintiffs must be sure
that the statistical methodology underlying their expert analysis
conforms to the standards pronounced by Daubert and its progeny.
This task includes ensuring that the expert has properly isolated the
effects of the revelation of fraud on stock price from other possible
factors. Neglecting to do so is to follow the path trod by the
plaintiffs in Williams and risk an adverse finding on summary
judgment.
B. Williams’s Burden
In Williams, the Tenth Circuit established a relatively heavy
evidentiary burden for plaintiffs on the issue of loss causation. The
court broke new ground at the appellate level by placing squarely
upon the shoulders of plaintiffs not only the burden of proving that
defendants committed fraud and the task of linking that fraud to a
subsequent loss, but also the responsibility of producing affirmative
evidence isolating the effects that the alleged fraud had on the stock
price from other non-fraud factors possibly affecting the stock
price.136 This requirement is consistent with the language of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the policy considerations
announced in Dura.
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 added
Section 21D(b)(4) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.137 This
section states, “In any private action arising under this chapter, the

136. See id.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
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plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of
the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”138 The language of the
Act does not expressly state which party bears the burden in cases
involving multiple causation—which side must show the portion of
the stock decline attributable to the fraudulent conduct, as opposed
to other non-fraud factors—but the plain text of the statute makes it
clear that the burden of proof in these types of cases should be on
the plaintiff.
If the language of the Act is to be given any weight, it is clear
that the plaintiff has the burden of proof in cases dealing with
multiple causation. The Act notes a very specific burden of proof:
“[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or
omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss . . . .”139 The language
of the Act is unambiguous: the plaintiff carries the burden of proving
that (1) the defendant committed an act or omission violative of the
Act; (2) the plaintiff suffered a loss; and (3) the defendant’s act or
omission caused the loss. Thus, it follows that, in order to prove it
was the defendant’s act or omission that caused the loss, the plaintiff
must also rule out other known possible causes of the loss.
2. Dura’s policy considerations
The Supreme Court has mentioned several times its continuing
concern that securities laws not be transformed into an insurance
policy.140 This consideration has been used in justifying the Court’s
reasoning on several securities-related issues, not just loss
causation.141 The Supreme Court reiterated in Dura that it did not
want to create a broad insurance policy for investors out of securities
laws.142 This suggests an initial presumption in multiple causation
securities fraud cases that any decline in a stock’s price was caused by
non-fraud factors. It follows, then, that in order to put the question
of loss causation before a jury, plaintiffs should have to overcome
138. Id. § 78u-4(b)(4).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345, 347–48 (2005).
141. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (“[A]llowing recovery in
the face of affirmative evidence of nonreliance . . . would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into a
scheme of investor’s insurance. There is no support in the Securities Exchange Act, the Rule,
or our cases for such a result.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
142. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345, 347–48.
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this presumption by presenting affirmative evidence to the contrary.
That is, plaintiffs must present evidence that the revelation of a
previous misrepresentation or omission, isolated from known nonfraud factors, caused a certain drop in a stock’s price. Any rule that
does not require plaintiffs to carry this burden assumes that because
there was an act or omission violative of the Act, and because there
was a decline in stock value, the decline was caused by the fraud; this
approach effectively alters “loss causation” into “loss coincidence”
and does just what the Supreme Court wanted to prevent: it
transforms securities laws into an insurance policy.
3. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit ultimately rested on a burden of proof
standard that is in harmony with the language of the Act. Williams
was the Tenth Circuit’s first case requiring an interpretation of
Dura’s loss causation requirements and the first case among the
circuits generally to do so in response to a Daubert challenge. Thus,
it was up to the Tenth Circuit to set a persuasive precedent as to the
burden of proof plaintiffs must meet in order to proceed to a jury for
a multiple causation case. By placing the burden of loss causation
fully on the plaintiffs, including the burden of showing which
portion of a decline in share price is attributable to the revelation of
previously concealed risks and which portion is attributable to other
non-fraud related factors, Williams clearly follows the plain meaning
of the Act. Under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, the plaintiff must
appropriately show that the defendant “caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”143
Additionally, the approach adopted in Williams takes into
account the policy underlying Dura. A rule requiring plaintiffs to
differentiate a decline in stock price due to fraud from a decline due
to other factors holds defendants accountable only for losses caused
by their allegedly fraudulent conduct. Thus, under the Tenth
Circuit’s burden of proof standard, defendants are far less likely to be
left holding the tab for losses not attributable to fraudulent conduct:
only losses “fairly attributable to the public airing of the alleged
fraud”144 are charged to the defendants.145 This prevents the

143. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
144. D.E. & J. Ltd. P’ship. v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 748–49 (E.D. Mich.
2003), aff’d, 133 F. App’x 994 (6th Cir. 2005).
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securities laws from being transformed into a broad insurance policy
for investors, which is what Dura aimed to avoid. Under Williams,
this concern is met by holding that an expert’s failure to account for
other possible non-fraud factors constitutes unreliable methodology.
As such, the expert witness cannot survive a Daubert challenge and
the plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden of proof regarding loss
causation.
The Tenth Circuit adopted its burden of proof requirements in
the face of the competing standards of various district courts. These
other approaches ranged from placing on the defendant the burden
of “severing the link” between the misrepresentation and the stock
price (in effect creating a rebuttable presumption that the price
decline was fraud related),146 to treating multiple causation as a factintensive inquiry best resolved by the jury and not on summary
judgment (in effect relieving the plaintiff, at the pleading stage, of
the burden of isolating the effect of fraud-related factors on stock).147
When compared to these approaches, it becomes even clearer that
the Tenth Circuit’s loss causation requirements best support the
language of the Act and the Supreme Court’s policy considerations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Williams has many significant
consequences for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud. First, Williams
clarifies the contours of Dura’s loss causation requirements and
provides a warning to securities fraud plaintiffs that courts may
exclude expert testimony that does not pass Daubert scrutiny or
meet Dura’s requirements. Further, Williams places the burden of
proving loss causation squarely on the shoulders of plaintiffs,
including the burden of accounting for the effect of possible nonfraud factors on a company’s stock price. Plaintiffs within the reach
of the Tenth Circuit wishing to avoid an unfavorable summary
judgment decision should study Williams and meet the appropriate
standards regarding loss causation in light of Dura and Daubert.

145. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345–46.
146. See In re Micron Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 635 (D. Idaho 2007).
147. Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 80 (D.D.C.
2008).
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